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Uncertainty, Self-Selection and the Design of Subsidies: Evidence from Zambia

In the absence of uncertainty, economic incentives for the adoption of a technology with positive environmental externalities can achieve the same adoption rates whether they are conditioned on the acquisition of inputs (take up) or on outcomes. If, on the other hand, potential adopters face uncertainty in the costs and benefits of implementation, conditioning incentives on outcomes may lead to both a different composition of adopters and level of adoption than will subsidizing inputs. We use a field experiment to investigate the correspondence between take up decisions and outcomes for a carbon-mitigating agricultural technology, and observe results consistent with the presence of uncertainty about implementation costs. The experimental variation identifies a structural model of intertemporal decision making under uncertainty that explains the experimental findings and informs welfare estimates. We further use the estimated model to study how different incentive structures perform as we vary assumptions about monitoring costs.

Speaker: Kelsy Jack, Tufts University

Friday, 10/25/13

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Free

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Giannini Hall

UC Berkeley
Room 201
Berkeley, CA 94720

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