Trusted Detection of Malicious Activities on Mobile Phones
For example, members of BGU cyber security labs have recently demonstrated, on Android based devices, how traffic which is tunneled via VPN can be intercepted before it has been encrypted.
In this seminar, two ongoing research studies at BGU cyber security labs will be reviewed. The studies focus on trusted detection of malicious activities that may indicate the presence of a malicious code running in the mobile device.
The first study tries to detect malicious activities by power analysis. The power measurements are performed directly on the battery and not within the device that could be accessible to the attacker. In this study it is demonstrated that critical sensor activation, such as GPS, by a malicious code of the attacker can be detected and that it is possible to distinguish between malicious and benign user activation.
The second study focuses on detecting sophisticated malicious code such as rootkits that attackers manage to install on mobile phones. The detection mechanism consists of both hardware and software components. The hardware component is based on the JTAG interface, which is present in most modern mobile phones and ARM processors. JTAG, which is an industry standard for hardware debug, allows to halt the core of the analyzed device without triggering the operation system. It enables monitoring the system memory while the rootkit is not aware that it is being analyzed. The software component consists of a detection mechanism that extracts the Android kernel's memory areas for further analysis.
Preliminary evaluation results of both studies will be presented.
Speaker: Yuval Elovici, Ben Gurion University
Wednesday, 02/12/14
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Gates Computer Science Building
NEC Auditorium (B3)
Stanford, CA 94305
Website: Click to Visit
