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Cap-and-Trade Programs Under Delayed Compliance

Although sometimes exceedingly complex, cap-and-trade regulations share some common features which have escaped notice. Previous analyses have assumed that firms must be in continual compliance, surrendering permits as they pollute. As we showed in a companion paper (Hasegawa and Salant, 2010), if .rms must cover their emissions on a continuing basis, then in the absence of uncertainty, the price path of permits may remain constant over measurable intervals while the government sells additional permits at a ceiling price or may even collapse in response to an anticipated injection of permits through a government auction.

Speaker: Stephen Salant, Univ. of Michigan

Friday, 04/13/12

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UC Berkeley

Energy Institute at Haas
2547 Channing Way
Berkeley, CA 94720

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